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Bottom Line Up Front
 Systems engineering principles
 Insights and conclusions:
 1) No perfect system
 2) Reaction time
 3) Persistent systems
 4) Kill-Chain Timeline (KCT) tradeoffs
 5) Undersea Joint Engagement Zones (UJEZ)





































.. design a system that denies 
enemy undersea forces 
(submarine and UUV) effective 
employment against friendly 
forces within the littorals during 
the 2025 timeframe.



























































Needs Analysis Obj Analysis Alt Generation Modeling Analysis Conclusions
Littorals:


























 Littoral ASW Threat
 Air Independent Propulsion Submarines
 Fuel Cell Technology Submarines
 Nuclear Powered Submarines
 Diesel Powered Submarines
 Unmanned Undersea Vehicles















 Measures of 
Effectiveness







 Defense of Island Nation Coastal  Choke Point Passage



































 Defense of island 
nation 
 Air and maritime 
superiority not 
established 
 3 enemy port 
facilities
 2 enemy AIP 
submarines in 
each
 2 enemy AIP 
submarines 
unlocated 
Littoral ASW Scenario: 
Area of Responsibility 
(AOR)











 Littoral Action Group (LAG)
 DD(X), LCS, SSN, MH-60
 Total Ship Systems Engineering (TSSE) – 
Sea TENTACLE
 Host ship, UUV, USV, UAV, Stationary Bottom Sensors 
 Tripwire
 UUV, Rapidly Deployable Stationary Bottom Sensors
 War of Machines
 UUV, Recharging Stations
 Floating Sensors





 1 DD(X) 
 3 LCS’s
 5 MH-60Rs
 2 on DD(X)
 1 per LCS
Littoral Action Group
Assets and Timeline
Needs Analysis Obj Analysis Alt Generation Modeling Analysis Conclusions










 3 TSSE Sea TENTACLE 
Ships
 144 Large UUVs
 144 UUV Sleds
 864 Light Weight UUVs




Needs Analysis Obj Analysis Alt Generation Modeling Analysis Conclusions













 Stationary Bottom Netted Sensors
 50 deployed outside each of the 3 harbors
 Sustainable through 30-day scenario
 UUV
 5 deployed outside each of the 3 harbors
 80 hr battery duration
Needs Analysis Obj Analysis Alt Generation Modeling Analysis Conclusions












 80 Heavy Weight Vehicles (HWV) UUVs
 71 HWV UUVs air-deployed
 3 HWV UUVs outside each Red Harbors
 12 Recharging stations
Needs Analysis Obj Analysis Alt Generation Modeling Analysis Conclusions
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Floating Sensors
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80% Pd by 130 
hours
LAG and Sea 
TENTACLE do not 
achieve 80% Pd until 
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Sea TENTACLE is 
sensitive to 
required track time 








Needs Analysis Obj Analysis Alt Generation Modeling Analysis Conclusions
War of Machines 
is insensitive to 
required track 
time due to 
invasive mobile 
platforms
Sensitivity to Required Continuous Track
 Time within First 10 Days
LAG shows a 
high probability 
of lost track 



















ASW Results, Insights 
and Recommendations
NO PERFECT SYSTEM
 Scenario variables were the key factors 
 Each alternative studied had 
weaknesses
 Differences between alternatives were 
significant
 “Best” solution might be a tailored mix




ASW Results, Insights 
and Recommendations
REACTION TIME
 Enemy submarines are vulnerable in 
restricted waterways
 Enemy timelines are unpredictable
 Quick reaction systems hedge 
uncertainty
 Strategic air least sensitive to enemy 
initiative




ASW Results, Insights 
and Recommendations
PRESENCE
 Pervasive persistence is the goal
 Traditional methods
 Non-traditional methods




ASW Results, Insights 
and Recommendations
KILL-CHAIN TIMELINE (KCT) 
TRADEOFFS
 Traditional methods require short KCTs
 Non-traditional methods afford longer 
KCTs
 Standoff weapons systems more easily 
used if longer KCT are allowed




ASW Results, Insights 
and Recommendations
UNDERSEA JOINT ENGAGEMENT ZONE 
(UJEZ)
 Cooperative mix of assets unlocks future 
ASW force capabilities 
 Future ASW forces may require the 
establishment of the UJEZ
 Low false positive and low fratricide 
rates are required








 Follow on study
 Development 
 UUVs
 Rapidly deployable sensing grids
 Common undersea picture
 Autonomous recharge/replenishment 
systems









 JSOW like systems to deliver ASW assets
 Doctrine 
 Evolution from waterspace management 
and PMI to UJEZ
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